CAMP

CAMPAIGN AGAINST

MARIJUANA PLANTING

1983
CAMP
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STEERING COMMITTEE

Maurice Babby, Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sacramento
Robert S. Gast II, Special Agent In Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation
San Francisco
Joseph E. Krueger, Special Agent In Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration,
San Francisco
Edward Hastey, California State Director, Bureau of Land Management
William Medigovich, Director, California Office of Emergency Services
Jerry Partain, Director, California Department of Forestry
Major General Willard A. Shank, California National Guard
James E. Smith, Commissioner, California Highway Patrol
Zane G. Smith Jr., Regional Forester, U.S. Department of Agriculture, San Francisco
Robert A. Smoak, Chief, Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of Interior
Arthur Van Court, U.S. Marshal, Eastern District of California
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California
Quintin L. Villanueva Jr., Regional Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Los Angeles
Lynn Wood, Sheriff, Stanislaus County; President, California State Sheriff's
Association
Walter A. Wysocki, Acting Special Agent In Charge, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms, San Francisco

CAMP FINAL REPORT 1983

Prepared by:
CAMP Headquarters

For additional copies or further information, contact Jack Beecham, Incident
Commander, CAMP Headquarters, P.O. Box 13327, Sacramento, California 95813
or by telephone at (916) 739-CAMP
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating Agencies - Federal and State</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid Team Members</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMP Member Counties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizures</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid Operations/Air Support</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries/Dangers of Conducting Raids</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Altitude Photo Mapping</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/Public Information Operation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMP Critique</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Marijuana Growing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Attachments

- **A** - History of Federal and State Support                         | 7    |
- **B** - Participating Agency Contributions                            | 10   |
- **C** - Objectives of CAMP 1983                                      | 11   |
- **D** - ICS Duties/Organizational Chart                               | 12   |
- **E** - CAMP Critique Summaries                                      | 14   |
- **F** - Impact on Environment, Economy and Crime                      | 20   |
The 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) was an overwhelming success with $130 million worth of marijuana kept off the streets of California. This year's effort was the culmination of six years of development by law enforcement and resource agencies from local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Details of previous years' efforts are available in Attachment A.

The goal of CAMP was the establishment of a task force through a cooperative effort by federal, state and local agencies to significantly diminish the cultivation of cannabis (the marijuana plant) and the trafficking of marijuana in the state of California. CAMP combined the technology, training and resources of twenty-seven federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and an additional eighteen agencies sent volunteers to assist in the eradication.

The local county sheriffs had the primary responsibility of marijuana enforcement and were supported by the many state and federal agencies involved in CAMP. Each member agency outlined its participation in a formal Memorandum of Understanding. The key to the success of CAMP was the cooperation among all the concerned agencies and the commitment of time, money, manpower, and equipment that was given by each. A complete cost breakdown is located in Attachment B.

Some of the major objectives of CAMP were to reduce the availability of marijuana in California through eradication of plants, arrest and prosecute the offenders, deter potential cultivators, and to promote the safe use of public and private lands by removing the criminal element that uses those lands illegally. A complete list of CAMP 1983 objectives is available in Attachment C.

The following federal and state agencies took part in CAMP:

**Federal Agencies**

- Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice (DEA)
- Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior (BLM)
- U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture (USFS)
- U.S. Marshal's Service, Department of Justice (USMS)
- Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of Treasury (ATF)
- U.S. Customs, Department of Treasury (USCS)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (FBI)
- Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, (BIA)

**State Agencies**

- Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, Department of Justice (BNE)
- Western States Information Network, Department of Justice (WSIN)
- Office of Emergency Services (OES)
- California Department of Forestry (CDF)
- California Highway Patrol (CHP)
- California Army National Guard (CANG)
Raid Team Members

A total of more than 250 police officers participated in CAMP raids. Team members included sheriff's deputies from the county in which the team was working, law enforcement officers from USFS, BLM, ATF, reserve deputies hired as temporary state employees with DEA funds and volunteers from 16 Northern and Southern California police departments, one sheriff's department, and one District Attorney's office. The reserve deputies, although paid by the state, were given full peace office powers by their county sheriffs and were then able to enforce laws wherever the raid team was working.

More than 80 police officers came from Northern and Southern California to assist in the eradication effort. These "volunteers" were recruited by BNE and were sent by their agencies because their department heads understood the importance of addressing the problem at its source.

The program also provided valuable training and experience for the officers involved. The officer's salaries and overtime were paid for by their agencies and transportation, food and lodging were provided by CAMP. The agencies sending officers included:

- Benicia P.D.
- Culver City P.D.
- El Monte P.D.
- Gilroy P.D.
- Inglewood P.D.
- Los Altos P.D.
- Montebello P.D.
- Pomona P.D.
- Redondo Beach P.D.
- San Jose Airport Police
- San Jose P.D.
- Santa Barbara S.O.
- Santa Clara P.D.
- Solano Co. D.A.'s Office
- Southgate P.D.
- Sunnyvale Dept. of Public Safety
- Torrance P.D.
- Ukiah P.D.

CAMP Member Counties

Fourteen Northern California counties, some of which were determined to be the major marijuana producing counties in the state were selected, based on data from 1981 and 1982 collected by the Western States Information Network (WSIN). Four regions were established covering the fourteen counties and each region had its own raid team. The regions and participating counties are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Region III</th>
<th>Region IV</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Butte</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
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<td>Lake</td>
<td>Yuba</td>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sonoma</td>
<td>Sierra</td>
<td>San Mateo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siskiyou</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey</td>
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</table>

Seizures

The planning stages of CAMP began in early 1983 with the formation of a Steering Committee comprised of representatives from the participating federal and state agencies, and included the California State Sheriff's Association. The actual raids began on August 15 and continued for ten weeks, ending on October 19, 1983. A total of 524 sites were raided resulting in the seizure of 64,579 plants with a total weight of over 271,000 pounds. Seventy-eight persons were arrested and at least
seventy persons have since been taken into custody or are pending arrest. More than 80 weapons were also confiscated.

The largest single marijuana eradication effort on record in California occurred in a Glenn County cornfield where local authorities seized more than 60,000 plants valued at nearly $50 million and arrested three persons. CAMP officials assisted in the destruction of the plants, but this seizure was not counted in CAMP's final tally since Glenn County was not one of the fourteen county participants.

Incident Command System

CAMP Headquarters were located at the Department of Justice, 4949 Broadway, Sacramento, 95820, phone (916) 739-CAMP. An Incident Command System (ICS) was established to efficiently utilize manpower and equipment during fires and other major operations. The structure of that system included the Steering Committee, a Deputy Incident Commander, Public Information Officer, Planning Section Chief, Operations Chief, Air Operations Chief and a Logistics and Finance Chief. Members of the ICS directed the activities of strike force teams and handled problems encountered by CAMP personnel that could not be solved in the field. Duties of the Incident Command System members are further outlined in Attachment D.

A Regional Coordinator (BNE agent) was assigned to each region with the responsibility of planning raids, arranging for lodging transportation for team members, preparing reports and reporting raid team activities to the Operations Chief. A strike force team leader (also a BNE agent) lead the team on the actual raids and reported directly to the Regional Coordinator.

Raid Operations/Air Support

Potential raid targets were identified through intelligence data and aerial observation. Specific sites were then selected and confirmation flights were conducted by fixed wing aircraft. This information was relayed to the Planning Section Chief and was also used to obtain search warrants for sites on private lands. Search warrants normally are not required on federal lands.

Federal law enforcement officers from U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management provided expertise in the area of federal lands and team members from Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and U.S. Marshal's Service were able to give advice and assistance in their specialized fields. Lead deputies had the monumental task of writing search warrants, collecting evidence, writing reports and filing cases for prosecution, while still participating in the raids.

UH-1 (Hueys) helicopters were utilized to provide air transportation for strike teams to remote and isolated marijuana gardens reducing ground travel time. Raid teams were inserted into the marijuana gardens where they arrested any suspects, collected evidence, chopped down the plants and removed cultivation equipment such as irrigation pipes, fertilizer bags, pumps, generators and even motorcycles. These items were then loaded into nets, hooked to a steel cable suspended from the helicopter and then flown to a landing zone.

The California Army National Guard provided three helicopters for the ten weeks of CAMP and the U.S. Customs Service provided one helicopter for eight weeks of the program. A helicopter from the FBI also took part for two weeks, and a CHP helicopter
was available for assistance as needed. A total of more than one hundred National Guard members, U.S. Customs, FBI and CHP personnel were involved in the operation and maintenance of the helicopters.

Although scheduled to work 4 day, 10 hour work weeks, raid team members often worked 15 hour days beginning with early morning briefings and ending with the destruction of plants seized during the days raids. This was accomplished with the use of a portable burn machine provided by Butte County or by using the burners at local lumber companies.

Inherent Dangers of Conducting Raids

One of the major concerns of CAMP personnel was the level of violence and lawlessness in marijuana growing counties. CAMP personnel encountered homemade booby traps, some designed to kill, others designed to warn intruders and law enforcement officers. Although there were instances when CAMP personnel were fired upon, no shots were fired by any CAMP officers.

Despite safety precautions taken by all members such as mandatory wearing of ballistics vests, there were two injuries to raid team members. One Culver City officer sustained a broken ankle while hiking through the rugged terrain and a BNE team leader broke an ankle leaving a hoving helicopter. No civilian personnel or suspects were injured during the many encounters with CAMP officials and every effort was made to protect the rights of both suspects and uninvolved citizens.

High Altitude Photo Mapping

It was hoped that the high altitude photo mapping (using U-2 or similar type aircraft) funded by Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Forest Service, United States Department of Interior, would provide the CAMP operation with additional information regarding the location of marijuana gardens and an overall assessment of the extent of the cultivation problem. Unfortunately, it appears that those flights provided no operational information and that aspect of the program will require further analysis before inclusion in future CAMP programs. The highly publicized flights may have had some deterrent effect on potential cultivators.

Media/Public Information Operation

A needed function in this year's program was a strong media/public information operation. The results were exemplified by the outstanding press and media attention that the program received thereby increasing public awareness. It was not unusual to attract 30 or more media representatives at a designated "media raid" and to respond to as many as 30 or more daily media inquiries ranging from live taped interviews to requests for daily statistics. The media was consistently supportive and positive throughout the program. Media coverage came from local, state, national and international sources.

Although the public information operation was coordinated at CAMP Headquarters, the local county sheriff was the key decision maker in determining how much information was made available to the media and how involved the press was allowed to become in the raids themselves.
CAMP Critique

On November 1 and 2, 1983, a two day "CAMP Critique" conference was held at the Holiday Inn in Sacramento. More than 200 participants evaluated the program's effectiveness and made suggestions for improving the campaign in 1984. Participants were assigned to one of eight committees and written reports were submitted by the chairman that covered the successes and failures of each.

The following areas were covered and are discussed in further details in Attachment E.

- Intelligence Data/Dissemination
- Air Operations
- Equipment
- Finance
- Training
- Field Operations
- Incident Command System
- Media Relations/Public Awareness

Impact of Marijuana on Environment, Economy and Crime

An informal survey was also conducted at the end of the growing season in an effort to determine the extent of impact marijuana growing has on the environment, economy and crime in the 14 CAMP counties. It was determined that methods used by cultivators are very damaging to our precious natural resources as well as to wildlife. Claims by commercial marijuana growers that they contribute to the overall economy of their communities also appear to be false, and the increase in threats and assaults in these counties are directly related to marijuana cultivation. Attachment F gives complete details of the survey.

Conclusion:

It was the unanimous conclusion of the agencies participating in CAMP that the program must be expanded, begin earlier in the year and investigation should continue past the growing season. The number of raid teams should be expanded to support additional sheriffs who feel they need the assistance of CAMP. Efforts will be made to recruit more federal and state agencies to participate in 1984.

Alternate approaches of eradication such as a red dye process being used in Arkansas, are being investigated in an effort to find other means of reducing successful harvests. Investigation of major organizations involved in marijuana cultivations will be conducted with emphasis on vigorous prosecution. This will include enforcement of California's new asset seizure laws (SB 1121) which allows law enforcement officials to seize the assets of certain convicted narcotic offenders when it is proven that those assets were obtained through illegal means. In 1984, teams specially trained in this complicated issue will be assigned to CAMP full-time.

Based on the experiences of CAMP personnel who encountered numerous "booby traps" in marijuana gardens this year, a bill regarding injurious devices will be presented to the Legislature. This legislation will hopefully provide sufficient deterrence to marijuana cultivators with whom these injurious devices are becoming increasingly popular.

-5-
The 1983 CAMP effort was a complex multi-agency program. It was accomplished with a high degree of success and professionalism and is a tribute to those who participated. The approach and cooperation has set an example for other states to follow and CAMP looks forward to even greater successes in 1984.
Marijuana cultivation in the United States is a multi-billion dollar industry and domestic growing has increased dramatically over the past years. California is no exception. Illegal cannabis cultivation is occurring in nearly every county in the state but commercial cultivation generally occurs in the more remote areas of the state. Northern California is particularly well suited for cultivation of the high grade marijuana known as "Sinsemilla" and some areas are famous for their crops.

The California marijuana eradication program began in 1977 when it became apparent that marijuana cultivation was increasing at an alarming rate. Because marijuana can be grown and concealed with relative ease in remote areas of the state, this type of criminal activity posed unique and serious problems for law enforcement. The problems included the difficulty of detection, the time intensive nature of physical eradication, the extensive investigation which must precede prosecution and the specialized training and equipment needed for large scale eradication operations in isolated areas. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that illegal cultivation is most prevalent in the same areas where law enforcement resources are most limited.

In 1979 the California Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) obtained a federal grant to assist the sheriffs in four Northern California counties with their eradication efforts. As a result of their combined efforts nearly 30,000 plants were seized weighing over 26 tons.

Public seminars were also conducted where citizens and local officials were made aware of the seriousness and extent of the problem. Training materials were developed and disseminated to police agencies and data collection procedures were instituted in order to assess the statewide problem.

In 1980 the program was expanded. BNE conducted 2 two-week Sinsemilla observer schools in order to train local police officers in the specialized field of marijuana eradication. Equipment such as 4-wheel drive vehicles and chain saws were purchased by BNE and both the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and BNE committed fixed wing aircraft to assist local agencies in spotting crops in Northern California. By the end of the 1980 crop year, 43 California counties had reported seizing a total of 156,000 plants and the arrest of over 1000 suspects.

The following year BNE once again coordinated with DEA and sheriff's departments for an even greater effort. More observer schools were conducted and other state narcotic agencies such as Texas, Arizona, Mississippi and Louisiana requested places for their officers in the school. In June, a BNE agent, at the request of DEA, went to Florida to help State and Federal authorities assess Florida's problem and develop a training program. Here in California, BNE, DEA, and the Attorney General's Special Prosecutions Unit (SPU) conducted a training seminar for prosecuting attorneys from 20 counties concerning the specialized problems involved with marijuana eradication cases.

Also in 1981 the U.S. Customs Service provided helicopter support which allowed a safe and more cost effective access to large crops in inaccessible areas of California's central coast.
During 1982 BNE assigned 10 special agents and two aircraft to support the efforts of local sheriff's departments. One prosecutor's seminar was conducted as well as an observers school, both which were jointly sponsored by BNE and DEA.

During June 1982 BNE sent an agent to the Federal Training Center at Glynco, Georgia, to help develop a regional training course for law enforcement agencies in the Southeast United States. Additionally, the Western States Information Network became the sole collector of seizure data. WSIN also continued to support the efforts of law enforcement agencies through intelligence gathering, dissemination, and developing graphic presentations for display during trials.

A significant change occurred in the overall effort with the involvement of the United States Forest Service (USFS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) resource management agencies. Additional funding and a new perspective—that of the damage to the environment from illicit cultivation activities—was gained.

The 1982 effort was a qualified success. While the number of crops seized rose from 1,040 in 1981 to 1,152 in 1982, the total number of plants seized dropped to 90,367. New aspects to the cannabis cultivation problem also became apparent. First, in that reporting of crop seizures by sheriff's departments is voluntary, it is very difficult to measure the representativeness of statistics. More important though, as more agencies became involved in the program, coordination of efforts was more difficult. Based on the four-years experience, BNE felt that a new approach was necessary because the overall effort was not as efficient or effective as it could be. The key reasons were:

- Regardless of the amount of financial support, most sheriff's departments in high density cultivation areas lack sufficient staff to allow diversion of their full-time staff to eradication functions and still carry out essential policing operations.

- The lack of coordination of those specialized resources which are necessary for an effective eradication effort; i.e., fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters with support equipment, trained observers, and crop destruction methods and facilities.

In September 1982 BNE approached DEA and requested a $25,000 grant to test a new approach. Reserve sheriff deputies and minimum wage work crews would be used on raids to replace high paid, full-time sheriff's deputies. Strike teams would be formed and raid on a regional basis instead of stopping at county lines.

The DEA grant was obtained in late September. The lateness of the planning precluded accessing state or federal work crews but BNE was able to hire as temporary state employees, reserves from three different Northern California sheriff's departments. The enforcement operations sponsored by DEA funds were conducted between October 11 and October 20, 1982 under the supervision of BNE special agents.

During the ten days of raiding in Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, 15 raids were conducted which resulted in nine arrests, the seizure of 2,227 plants (7,144 pounds) and 1,186 pounds of dried and processed marijuana. Based on this experience, the regionalized strike force approach seemed viable.
In March 1983 BNE at the direction of the Attorney General, invited the principal state and federal agencies to meet and plan a unified program. Those agencies were the Bureau of Land Management, United States Forest Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, Office of Emergency Services, and Department of Forestry. The Western States Information Network identified the high density growing areas in California so that a regionalized approach could be developed.

As the program took shape, additional agencies became involved—the United States Marshal's Office, U.S. Customs Service, California National Guard, and California Highway Patrol. When the program was finalized, it was presented to and approved by fourteen sheriffs in four regions.

The approach was to provide the governmental response necessary to control the illegal growing of cannabis in California, Federal, State and local resources had to be brought to bear on the problem through the concept of mutual aid. Due to the scope of the effort required, these resources had to be provided, in some cases, by agencies not normally involved in such activities. The very number and diversity of the agencies possessing the needed resources dictate that they be brought together in a highly structured, coordinated manner.

To provide the vehicle for the focusing of multi-level, multi-agency resources on the problem, a jointly operated local-state-federal organization was conceived and titled the "Campaign Against Marijuana Planting" and is referred to by the acronym "CAMP".
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Objectives of CAMP 1983

Most of the objectives which were established for the 1983 CAMP program were met and these objectives will become an integral part of the 1984 program. These objectives include:

1. Reduce the availability of marijuana in the State of California through the eradication of illegally cultivated plants.
2. Arrest and prosecute those who cultivate and traffic in that drug.
3. Seize and forfeit assets and proceeds derived from the cultivation of cannabis and the trafficking of marijuana.
4. Determine the extent of cannabis cultivation throughout California on public and private lands.
5. Promote the safe use of public and private lands by the removal of lawless elements who illegally use those lands to cultivate cannabis.
6. Reduce associated criminal activity in areas where cannabis cultivation occurs.
7. Reduce the environmental impact on public lands caused through the uncontrolled introduction of substances harmful to the environment by illegal cannabis cultivation.
8. Deter potential cannabis cultivators.
9. Develop a public awareness and crime prevention program to inform the public of the inherent dangers associated with the cultivation of cannabis and the trafficking of marijuana.
10. Evaluate, at the end of the growing season, the task force's effectiveness at accomplishing these objectives.
ICS DUTIES

Deputy Incident Command - Bob Elsberg, BNE

Handled the day-to-day management needs, supervised BNE employees, responsible for operational command decisions during those times the steering committee was not meeting. Also, handled any unusual occurrences such as the lawsuit initiated by NORML against CAMP.

Public Information Officer - Al King, BNE

Responsible for program interface with the news media and civic groups and coordination of program related news releases. Maintained close liaison with the deputy incident commander and operated from CAMP headquarters. During the height of the program, an experienced public information officer, Lynn Engles from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, also assisted with the media.

Planning Section Chief - Bill Ruzzamenti, DEA

Developed weekly field operations plans based on intelligence data. Responsible for the collection of intelligence, statistics and their dissemination. Assisted by a DEA analyst.

Logistics Section Chief - Chuck Fike, U.S. Forest Service

Responsible for the coordination of logistics in support of field operations.

Finance Section Chief - Ed Machado, BNE

Handled program fiscal control and accounting. Authorized emergency purchases by regional coordinators, evaluated spending needs of BNE and other involved agencies.

Operations Sections Chief - Dave Howard, BLM

Responsible for implementing the approved weekly field operations plans. Ensured an information flow between regions and CAMP headquarters regarding weekly operations plans.

Air Operations Chief - Dan Rominger, CDF

Coordinated air support for field operations which included scheduling of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
ICS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

STEERING COMMITTEE
UNIFIED COMMAND GHQ

DEPUTY INCIDENT COMMANDER
BOB ELSEBERG, BNE

INFORMATION OFFICER
AL KING

AIR OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR
DON ROHNERG, CDF

PLANNING SECTION
CHIEF
BILL RUZZAMENTI, DEA

OPERATIONS
SECTION CHIEF
DAVE HOWARD, BLM

LOGISTICS
SECTION CHIEF
CHUCK FIKE, USFS

FINANCE
SECTION CHIEF
ED MACHADO, BNE

REGIONAL COORDINATOR
REGION I
(PLANS, FINANCE)
ERWIN WADE, BNE

REGIONAL COORDINATOR
REGION II
(PLANS, FINANCE)
KEN MARTIN, BNE

REGIONAL COORDINATOR
REGION III
(PLANS, FINANCE)
MIKE FREER, BNE

REGIONAL COORDINATOR
REGION IV
(PLANS, FINANCE)
RANDY ROSSI, BNE

LOCAL LOGISTICS

STRIKE TEAM LEADERS: (BNE) EARL "MICK" MOLLICA, DAVE BECK,
LAURIE WOODS, GENE LERNER

STRIKE TEAM
ATTACHMENT E

CAMP CRITIQUE

At the conclusion of the 1983 CAMP program a 2-day conference was held on November 1 and 2 in Sacramento for a critique of the program by those involved.

Subcommittees were formed to identify issues and problems that arose during the campaign. The subcommittees were made up of federal, state, and local agency representatives. These committee members discussed problems and proposed recommendations that would assist CAMP personnel in the planning of the 1984 CAMP program.

Included in this attachment are summaries of the subcommittee reports.

Overall, the one conclusion drawn by all of the subcommittees was that CAMP was a success. The committees felt that the highly qualified personnel and the application of experience and innovation by those dedicated professionals, coupled with the spirit of cooperation made the program a winner.

Intelligence Data and Dissemination

This committee examined such issues as prioritization of raid target areas, detection and overflights, the role of WSIN and the reporting system of all information to CAMP.

The committee recommended that each region have the coordinator and the lead deputies prioritize the target areas within the region and submit the target list far enough in advance for headquarters coordination.

The overflight and detection problems discussed included the lack of communication between the lead deputies, the regional coordinator and the incident command system. The differences in the maps used and the reporting of targets to the ICS became confusing to the DEA analyst assigned to CAMP.

The committee recommended that a standard set of maps be used by all participating agencies including BLM, USFS and local sheriffs.

The committee further recommended that upon completion of an overflight of a target area, the regional coordinator, lead deputy and pilot discuss the flight and assign that overflight a specific number. That number would be forwarded to the ICS where it would be logged and placed on a priority list.

WSIN's role was discussed in detail. The committee recommended that WSIN remain as a vital liaison for CAMP. The WSIN representative should take a more active role in the intelligence gathering and follow-up analysis, and a WSIN representative should be assigned to CAMP permanently. The committee felt that if the numbering system mentioned above was implemented and the information was received and forwarded to WSIN it would simplify all reporting difficulties.
Air Operations

The air support for the 1983 CAMP program consisted of four helicopters and five fixed wing aircraft. The fixed wing aircraft, used primarily for aerial observations, were furnished by the California Department of Justice and local law enforcement agencies. The helicopters along with pilots, crew chiefs, medics and fuel crews were furnished by the California Army National Guard and United States Customs Air Support. The use of helicopters proved to be the most safe, efficient, and successful means of operating. The helicopters were also used for reconnaissance, to insert personnel into the garden sites and to extract the heavy loads of marijuana with nets.

The critique of the CAMP air operations by the subcommittee developed specific issues and problems for consideration. Each issue was discussed relative to the associated problems with recommendations.

The first issue and recommendation met by the committee was the role of air operations director within the frame work of the incident command system. The ICS was basically designed to assist in the management of large and complex disasters, such as floods and fires. The committee recommended that the ICS continue as the command structure, but with the needs of CAMP taken into consideration. The ICS should specify a detailed format on the role of the air operation director.

The second issue faced by the committee was concerning helitack and its safety and efficiency factors during the program. The committee recommended that the helitack concept continue to be a integral part of all CAMP helicopter operations, but to assign only helitack personnel that have been trained and qualified by an agency that has a permanent and full-time helitack organization, one that subscribes to Federal Inter-agency Helicopter Training Guide, such as the U.S. Forest Service.

The third issue discussed by the committee was communications. The main problem reported during the campaign was that the four regions operated with different communication systems. The problems that arose with this type of system were that some aircraft did not have common frequencies with the ground crews and strike teams. The portable radios provided to the aircraft were frequently unreliable.

The committee recommended that a communications system be implemented that will unify all regions in operation. The purchasing of portable radios that have multi-range and multi-frequency capabilities would be a tremendous asset to the communications between aircraft and ground personnel.

The issue concerning aircraft navigation was discussed briefly. Navigational aids, specifically Lorans, were used only in fixed wing aircraft. The committee recommended that all aircraft, including helicopters be equipped with Lorans. This would provide the helicopters with the ability to locate the garden sites within a minimal amount of time.

The air operations committee also discussed the facts of too few aircraft and the shortage of jet fuel on the Northern California coast line. The committee recommended that research be done on the use of smaller helicopters for reconnaissance of garden sites, such as Hughes 500 models. The cost to operate the smaller helicopters is considerably less than the large utility Huey models.
The final recommendation from the air operations committee was to have the air operations director start the planning, coordination and problem solving prior to the start of the 1984 program.

**Equipment**

The objective of this subcommittee was to evaluate the suitability and effectiveness of the equipment used during CAMP and the methods for disposal of marijuana in field locations. The committee, after reviewing the major issues on equipment, made the following recommendations on vehicles, clothing and equipment used on a day-to-day basis.

There were several types of vehicles utilized during the program. Three of the four regions operating used trailers to transport equipment for the strike teams. The large trailers were pulled into the field every day. The committee recommended that the cumbersome and sometime dangerous trailers not be used in the future.

One region was lucky enough to use a utility truck donated by Sierra County Sheriff's office for transportation and storage of equipment. This type of vehicle provided safe and orderly maintenance of equipment and provided inside seating for strike team members. This type of vehicle was proven to be the safest and most practical, and should be put in operation in all regions. In addition to the other vehicles used, the committee recommended that 3/4 ton 4x4 trucks be provided for the strike teams along with either large dump trucks or stake side trucks for the transportation of marijuana to destruction sights.

On the issue of defensive equipment, the committee recommended that CAMP continue with the safety policy of mandatory wearing of ballistics vests. However, some models are too heavy and much too hot for the strenuous day-to-day activities. Heat stroke was a major concern to the strike team members. With this in mind, the committee recommended that light weight, vital area protection, "Level II Threat" vests be provided.

Polyester clothing that was provided to raid team members in CAMP 1983 should be strictly avoided. In case of fires such as often occurs during helicopter crashes, polyester melts, adhering to the skin and causing severe complications. Polyester fabrics also promote the spread of skin rashes such as the poison oak that afflicted approximately 50% of raid team members.

Cotton material clothing or cotton treated with Nomex is a mandatory requirement for resource agency personnel subjected to helicopter flight duties. This is an aircraft fire safety requirement. The extensive use of helicopters in the CAMP project subjects CAMP personnel to the same aircraft fire risks, thus all CAMP personnel should be provided with cotton clothing.

The one cutting tool primarily used by the strike teams was the swedish brush ax or "sandvik". This tool was found to be the safest and most practical tool for use by team members. Sandviks as well as machetes should become part of the permanent equipment issued to raid teams.

Disposal by burning on site is effective, but time consuming. The committee recommended that portable burners like the ones the U.S. Forest Service uses to burn brush be issued to every strike team.
The red dye solution shows a lot of promise. The committee strongly recommended that a study be conducted on the effectiveness of the legality of this product.

**Finance**

CAMP 1983 was completed within budget but certain recommendations were made that should make future programs run more smoothly. Funding needs to be provided for local expenses associated with CAMP such as costs for film developing, aircraft rental and evidence storage and these needs must be identified prior to the operation. Additional funding may also be needed to assist local district attorney's offices with the additional expenses they incur while prosecuting CAMP related cases.

Studies should be made to determine where savings can be made in the areas of lodging for team members, getting contracts for best rates, asking private companies to help support the program and acquiring legislation to provide a source of income.

**Training**

The training program for the 1983 CAMP program was unique in that the Department of Justice, with the support of allied federal agencies, took on the task of organizing not only the annual two-week aerial observation and commercial eradication course, but also for the first time, 5 two-day training courses for strike team personnel. These training courses were conducted in the four regions of the CAMP operation and also in Southern California, with a total of over 120 participants.

The issues and problems which are inevitable with this type of first year program, focused primarily on the two-day training courses, the prescreening of all strike team members, and safety and proficiency related courses.

Upon reviewing the issues of the four regions, the committee found that the two-day training course was standard for all strike team members, but recommended the course be lengthened in the health and safety portions. Booby traps, first aid, survival and helicopter landing zone procedures should be covered in greater detail.

The day-to-day activities of the strike team members which consisted of long hours and very physical work brought out the issue of prescreening the personnel. Two regions reported having strike team members that were overweight and generally in poor physical condition. Also, as part of the prescreening, special skills, experience and training should also be identified in order to make each team more self-sufficient.

The committee proposed training in rappelling, rope ladders and billy pugh nets. The use of such equipment would discontinue the practice of jumping from the helicopters which could prevent injuries.

Finally, the committee suggested that all training should be POST certified. This certification allows agencies to be reimbursed for the cost of their personnel attending the training, and also allows for the governing authority to certify such training.
Field Operations

The field operations subcommittee examined numerous issues from day-to-day duties of the regional coordinators and the strike teams, to the role of the incident command system and the deputization of U.S. Marshals. The subcommittee felt that roles and responsibilities of the coordinators team leaders and lead deputies should be well defined and strictly adhered to. The committee recommended that the regional coordinators should have an assistant as the duties during the campaign became too overwhelming for one person.

The committee also recommended that the incident command system chiefs establish a time-table for the program. The earliest preparation for the program would assist in the establishing priorities for the 1984 campaign.

The committee recommended that Humboldt County be placed into a region of its own with a minimum of two strike teams. The additional time in Humboldt County would be well spent.

The next issue discussed by the committee was a very critical one. Special agents of the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service do not have police powers on private lands. This causes a hardship on the strike team since BLM and USFS agents are a valuable asset to the team. The committee recommended that the U.S. Marshal's Office deputize BLM and USFS personnel for the duration of CAMP. The deputization of the federal agents would give them police powers on public and private lands throughout the state.

Incident Command System

An example of its effectiveness was the speed in which the system reacted when on August 24, 1983 a customs helicopter assigned to the CAMP program went down in a remote area of the Santa Cruz mountains. Within hours of going down, the helicopter, helicopter crew, and CAMP crew were removed from the site. (This was accomplished through the ICS coordination between the team leader/regional coordinator/incident commander/air operations chief/ and allied agencies such as the Office of Emergency Services and California National Guard).

Although communications were generally good between regional coordinators and ICS members it was occasionally difficult to make contact with each other due to the remote locations of most raid sites and the late hours worked by raid teams. It was determined that coordinators be equipped with portable telephones and that the ICS chiefs be assigned to CAMP full-time by their agencies and available 24 hours for emergencies.

The duties of the deputy incident commander were two numerous and included supervising the 12 special agents assigned to CAMP, reviewing paper work, and handling unexpected events such as federal law suits. It was recommended that a special agent supervisor be assigned to the CAMP BNE crew during the enforcement portion of the CAMP program to supervise the agents while the deputy incident commander oversees the CAMP operation at headquarters.

Additional personnel are a necessity. At least 2 additional secretaries should be assigned to CAMP with additional personnel assigned to assist the public information officer and the finance chief.
It was recommended that more training occur prior to operations as to the duties and responsibilities of each of the roles in the ICS, that the training not only be given to those in the ICS command roles but to all those involved in the operation. Everyone in the CAMP operation should know the proper flow of communication.

Media Relations/Public Awareness

The 1983 CAMP program attracted and received major media attention. The subcommittee that discussed the media issues made recommendations involving public awareness, media relations and training on how to deal with the media.

The public awareness campaign should be developed and initiated prior to any raids and continued throughout the entire CAMP program. The public awareness support for marijuana eradication is fundamental to the program, and one cannot assume that it will be there automatically. The support must be developed not only with the media but also through schools and community relations.

The committee recommended that adequate staff trained to handle the media should be assigned to CAMP on a full-time basis. It was noted that the Bureau of Indian Affairs assigned a media trained person who provided excellent background and support during the height of the media coverage.

It was suggested that raid team members, as part of their required training, receive instructions on how to deal with the media. It was further recommended that press personnel be equipped with CAMP "press passes" or badges while in the field with CAMP personnel in order to provide security for both the press officials and raid team members.
IMPACT OF MARIJUANA ON ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY AND CRIME

The following report describes some of the problems caused by marijuana growing such as the violence associated with cultivation and the environmental damage caused by the carelessness of growers. Also covered is how cultivation affects the economics of the major marijuana growing counties in California and the extent of the involvement of the organized criminal element.

Due to the violence and lack of resources available to local law enforcement agencies the 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) was formed, combining the resources and technology of 27 federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to eradicate marijuana gardens in 14 Northern California counties. The 14 counties, Humboldt, Trinity, Del Norte, Siskiyou, Mendocino, Sonoma, Lake, Butte, Yuba, Sierra, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, San Mateo, and Monterey were selected based on previous years crop seizure data revealing them to be the major marijuana producing counties in California.

Violence continued to be a factor in marijuana cultivation in 1983. It was documented that on several occasions CAMP members were fired upon and numerous booby traps and weapons were seized at garden sites.

Violence has become a way of life in marijuana growing communities. Authorities estimate that at least 80% of marijuana growers are armed during early summer and nearly all carry guns at harvest time. Reports of hundreds of threats both on public and private lands are received every year. Citizens who happen to be on marijuana gardens are often threatened by growers and assaults among the growers themselves are increasing. This had placed an added enforcement burden on local authorities in the 14 major marijuana cultivation counties where sheriff's departments are traditionally understaffed and not able to handle the increase in violent crime.

In Humboldt County this year at least a dozen threats were made to citizens by marijuana growers who were apparently afraid they would be discovered by authorities. One off duty Humboldt sheriff's deputy was confronted while hunting by subjects carrying automatic weapons who warned him to stay out of the area. In Santa Cruz County where most of the land is private authorities received at least 20 reports from hikers and horseback riders who had been threatened by growers. Several landowners received threats on their own property from trespassers who were using the land for cultivation.

U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management personnel have received threats while performing their duties on public lands and some employees have expressed reluctance to enter some areas of the forest due to fear of being assaulted.

Although most confrontations between growers go unreported, in the past 3 years there have been at least 12 murders in the 14 major marijuana growing counties which can be directly linked to marijuana cultivation. Numerous "rip offs" (thefts of money, plants, equipment) occur between growers, including an incident in Mendocino County where 3 persons were shot while attempting to steal marijuana plants. A patient in a Eureka hospital admitted having been shot with rock salt while trying to "rip off" a grower.

This year in Yuba County where 4 armed growers were arrested while protecting a 4,000 plant garden, the subjects expressed relief that it was the police who had raided their garden and not "bikers". The guards had been warned that should bikers find them they would not only steal the marijuana but kill the guards as well.
More than 80 handguns, rifles, shotguns, and automatic weapons were confiscated by law enforcement officials during the 1983 CAMP program. In addition to the guns, marijuana growers often train guard dogs such as dobermans, or pit bulls, to protect their gardens. But perhaps the most dangerous items found in the gardens are booby traps ranging from electric fences to trip wires, pungi sticks and rat traps with shotgun shells attached. Over 20 such booby traps were confiscated by authorities in the 14 CAMP counties this year alone.

There are many problems associated with marijuana growing which can be attributed to the carelessness of growers. During the past 3 years over a dozen fires have been started accidentally by growers.

Clear cutting, the removal of large areas of trees and shrubs to facilitate the cultivation of marijuana is present in 80% of marijuana gardens, both private and public lands. The trees are removed to allow more sunlight to reach the growing plants and to make room for large gardens, causing serious erosion problems.

Other areas of concern include the use of chemical fertilizers, organic fertilizers, misuse of delicate sources such as lakes and streams, use of rodenticides and items left in the environment by the growers at the end of the season.

The most often recommended fertilizers for the marijuana farmer are the high nitrogen types which act quickly because all the nutrients are in soluble form. They are usually more concentrated than organic fertilizers and are more convenient and easily transported to remote areas. A high nitrogen compound is most often used because the availability of nitrogen is the factor most likely to determine the growth of marijuana.

According to a report in December 1981 by the U.S. Forest Service, chemical fertilizers can leach into ground water and end up in downstream water supplies. The overbalance of nitrogen in streams can have an adverse effect on invertebrates which may not survive in a highly oxygenated environment. Wildlife biologists from the California Department of Fish and Game have reported finding significant problems with marine life due to over oxygenated water. This has occurred downstream from greenhouses in which high nitrogen fertilizers are used.

During the 1983 CAMP program nearly all of the fertilization systems found were the high-nitro types. Fertilizer was either dumped into large doughboy pools and fed to the plants through a series of pvc pipes and emitters or applied in-line through mixers. Often the bags of fertilizers were left lying on the ground open with the contents spilled and no effort made to clean up the mess caused by them. Once the fertilizer is exposed to moisture such as rain or dew the highly concentrated mixture is absorbed into the ground burning both the soil and nearby plant life, as well as leaching into water supplies.

Also used in some areas in the urea type (turkey, chicken manure) fertilizer. This has become popular, particularly in Trinity County as a more natural "organic" fertilizer and is advertised in most marijuana growing publications. The U.S. Forest Service states that urea type fertilizers are applied at a rate of 250 pounds per acre. These types also leach into streams damaging water supplies and fisheries.

Bat Guano from the caves of New Mexico is often advertised as the "world greatest fertilizer". As well as causing the usual damage to water supplies, proponents of bat guano admit that breathing bat guano is dangerous. According to "Sinside Tips" magazine, bat guano is an "incredible microbial stimulator causing congestion and coughing".
Of all the types of fertilizer found by CAMP members there was none which, according to U.S. Forest Service, is not harmful to the environment.

Types Used:

- Chemical fertilizer only: 85%
- Organic only: 5%
- Both chemical and organic: 8%
- No fertilizer used: 2%

Method of Application:

- Mixed into doughboy type pools or containers: 40%
- In-line mixes: 30%
- Mixed and applied manually: 10%
- Any combination of above: 20%

Types of Water Sources:

- Doughboy type pools or other large collectors (water usually pumped from lake or stream to pool and fed back to gardens through drip irrigation): 40%
- Fed directly downhill to gardens from water source by gravity using drip irrigation or hoses: 15%
- Water is pumped uphill from water source using electric pump or gasoline powered generator, then allowed to feed back downhill thru pipes or hoses to gardens: 35%
- Plants grown in swamp lands or river bottom requiring no additional irrigation: 5%
- Conventional sources such as hose from residence: 5%

Marijuana growing manuals identify the following as potentially harmful to marijuana plants:

- insects
- rabbits
- rats
- cats
- mice
- deer
- moles
- squirrels
- birds
- groundhogs

"D-Con" type rat poisons and other chemical rodenticides are common on marijuana plantations. According to the U.S. Forest Service, marijuana growers use as much as 300 lbs. per acre of rodenticides usually in riparian (stream side) areas which not only eliminate rodents, but birds and other small wildlife as well. Animals up the food chain are often affected and some poisons, if ingested by deer, could eventually harm humans if the deer is killed by humans and later eaten.

Large rat traps are also used to control pests. Hundreds of such traps have been found by law enforcement and the most common bait used, peanut butter, attracts not only rats but groundhogs, squirrels, mice, rabbits and birds.
As a deterrent to deer and other larger animals, chicken wire fencing is placed around marijuana gardens. The fences are sometimes as high as ten feet and often small shrubs, branches and slash are used as camouflage. Because of the difficult terrain it is easier for the growers to leave fencing materials behind when they harvest. In gardens that law enforcement found had been harvested prior to their arrival, no effort had been made to remove these items from the environment, particularly on public lands.

The following percentages apply to the frequency - the below listed items were encountered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical rodenticides</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rat traps</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deer repellent</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items found in gardens or left behind by growers:

1. Drip irrigation or hoses.
2. Doughboy pools.
3. Bags of chemical fertilizer.
4. In-line fertilizer systems.
5. Plastic bags used for growing.
6. Chicken/turkey manure fertilizer.
7. Open bags of fertilizer dumped on ground or into streams.
8. 1 gallon and 5 gallon containers.
9. Makeshift cabins.
10. Stoves, tents, sleeping bags.
12. Tools such as shovels and rakes.
15. Various booby traps.

The extent of marijuana cultivation can usually be determined by large sums of money being placed in banks or spent in the principal marijuana growing communities. However, due to IRS requirements that cash deposits/withdrawals of $10,000 or more be reported to them, growers are more likely to keep money in safe deposit boxes or send it out of the area.

Advocates of marijuana growing claim that cultivation keeps their economy going and that money earned by growers stays within the community.

A portion of the marijuana growers proceeds is spent on land, marijuana cultivation equipment, four wheel drive vehicles and supplies such as fertilizer but the largest percentage is taken out of the marijuana growing community.

In Humboldt County it is believed that 60-70% of money earned from marijuana cultivation goes out of the county. The remaining 30-40% is often reinvested by growers in larger plots and additional acreage, usually in cash transactions.

Growers sometimes spend 3-4 times what a plot is actually worth just to obtain prime marijuana growing land and land prices have sharply risen in the past few years.
Many marijuana advocates also believe that marijuana growing is done by local residents in an effort to supplement their incomes. Although this may be true in part, the majority of marijuana growers are transient and stay only for the growing season taking more of their earnings with them when they leave.

In Butte County approximately half of the growers come from areas outside Butte and at the end of the season they return to areas such as Southern California or the San Francisco Bay area. In Santa Cruz County it is believed that only 30% of the marijuana produced income stays within the county. Most of the money goes elsewhere since the majority of the large growers are not local.

Growers come to Humboldt County from Arizona, Southern California and as far away as Oklahoma to cultivate. The post office in Humboldt County receives a tremendous influx of "change of address" forms at the beginning and end of the marijuana season indicating that many persons migrate to the area for the marijuana season only.

U-Haul type trailers could not be found in Humboldt County at the end of the 1983 harvest as they had all been previously rented, presumably by marijuana growers for transportation of the crops out of the area. The rental trailers were not returned to the Humboldt County area but were rented one-way only and according to information obtained from rental dealers were often turned in with marijuana debris scattered throughout.

Most of the other major marijuana growing counties believe that a large portion of the income from marijuana growing does not stay within their local area, with the exception of Monterey County. Due to the small size of most of the Monterey County gardens it is believed that most of their growers are local and harvest the crops for local use and distribution. Monterey County authorities did confiscate some processed marijuana from a suspect who claimed that it had been imported to Monterey from Humboldt County.

More intelligence data is needed to determine the extent of the involvement of organized crime in marijuana cultivation. In the past few years information regarding the background and activities of marijuana growers was not routinely kept by local agencies. In Humboldt County, however, intelligence has been gathered regarding several large families who are buying more and more property every year increasing their production in an effort to monopolize the marijuana market.

This year several persons were arrested who were part of organized groups, such as two subjects who are documented members of an outlaw motorcycle gang. A sophisticated growing operation in Yuba County worth $8 million was financed and being run by persons in Southern California. This same group is presently under investigation by U.S. Customs for marijuana smuggling.

Other persons arrested were found to be members of various Co-Op organizations dedicated to the growing of marijuana and the relaxing of marijuana laws. Information is still being collected to determine the backgrounds of criminal records of all those arrested this year.

It is true that the cultivation and sale of marijuana does contribute to the economy in the form of tax-free earnings for the marijuana farmer who may spend a portion of his earnings in the area where his garden is located. However, the increase in violence, misuse of precious natural resources, damage to the environment, disregard for the rights of other citizens and the general lawlessness of the marijuana growing community overshadows any positive aspects of marijuana cultivation.